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REGULATED INDUSTRIES

Ratable Taking v. Take-or-Pay:
Hijinks in the Gas Patch
by Gary D. Allison

Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
V.

State Oil and Gas Board
(Docket No. 84-1076)
Argued October 8, 1985
ISSUES
In this case, the Supreme Court will reconsider its
holding in Northern Natural Gas Corp. v. State Corporation
Commission (372 U.S. 84 (1963)) [Northern Natural] that
state ratable taking and common purchaser regulation
of interstate pipe lines is preempted by federal regulation of the interstate natural gas market under the Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA). This involves determining
whether:
1. Congress, by enacting natural gas deregulation mechanisms in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA),
so altered the federal regulation of resale and
transportation of gas in interstate commerce as to
permit a revival of state ratable taking and common
purchaser regulation as applied to interstate pipe
lines, and
2. In light of current conditions within domestic natural
gas markets, state ratable taking and common purchaser regulation imposes impermissible burdens on
interstate commerce.
FACTS
In 1978, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. (Transco)
began purchasing deregulated natural gas produced
from a common pool in Mississippi under about thirtyfive different long-term take-or-pay contracts. Transco
did not contract with every person owning percentages
of the working interests in the wells from which it purchased gas. Instead, Transco contracted with the major
interest owners, who generally were the operators of the
wells, and for a while took on the same terms as specified
in its gas purchase contracts all the gas produced from
each well. By the spring of 1982, Transco was having
difficulty selling its natural gas. In response to its market-clearing problem, Transco announced it would no
longer take gas from the non-contract owners unless
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they would agree to accept flexible market-out prices
that were generally lower than those Transco was paying
the contract owners.
Coastal, a non-contract owner, refused to accept
Transco's offer and petitioned the Mississippi Oil and
Gas Board for a ratable taking order requiring Transco
to purchase gas from all the owners in the common pool
on a non-discriminatory basis, The Oil and Gas Board
entered an order requiring Transco to "ratably take and
purchase gas without discrimination in favor of one
owner, operator or producer against another in the said
common source or pool" (457 So.2d 1298, 1328 (Miss.
Sup. Ct. 1984).
Transco appealed the Oil and Gas Board order to
the Mississippi Supreme Court. That court upheld the
Oil and Gas Board order as to its applicability to interstate pipe lines and its requirement that Transco allocate
its demand for natural gas from a common pool ratably
among all owners. The court further ruled that as a
matter of state law, the Oil and Gas Board lacks the
authority to require Transco to offer non-discriminatory prices to every owner from which it purchases gas.
However, the court did rule that "to comply with its ...
obligations, the pipeline must offer in good faith reasonable terms, including a reasonable price, determined by
reference to prevailing market conditions and other
appropriate economic considerations."
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Supreme Court's Northern Natural holding was a
logical extension of its ruling in PhillipsPetroleum Co. v.
Wisconsin (347 U.S. 672 (1954)), that federal regulatory
authorities applied to interstate sales at the wellhead.
After Phillips, the Federal Power Commission (now the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [FERC]), with
some prodding from the federal courts, determined that
just and reasonable wellhead prices should be based on
producer costs rather than the market value of gas. Such
prices were well below the market value of natural gas.
Ten years later, after Northern Natural was decided,
states provided producers some measure of protection
refusing to regulate the wellhead sales of natural gas in
intrastate commerce. It did not take long before the
market prices available in the intrastate markets were so
much higher than the cost-based interstate prices that
producers increasingly refused to sell natural gas in
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interstate commerce. By the 1970s, the intrastate/interstate price differentials were producing severe
natural gas shortages within the interstate market.
Seeking an end to the natural gas shortage crisis,
both houses of Congress developed new natural gas
legislation designed to bring the intrastate and interstate
markets tnder a common structure. After over a year of
acrimonious debate, conflicting House/Senate bills were
finally rationalized into the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978 (NGPA). The NGPA extended wellhead price regulation to the intrastate markets, severely curtailed the
wellhead price setting authority of tile FERC by establishing legislatively-determined price ceilings containing
their own escalation mechanisms, and set in motion al
8.5 year phased-in deregulation of wellhead prices on
most natural gas categories.
Fresh from the discomforts of the interstate natural
gas shortages of the 1970s, in 1979-81, many interstate
pipe lines rushed to contract large supplies of deregulated deep and high-priced gas. In the process of acquiring these new supplies, the pipe lines offered
astronomically high prices on a take-or-pay basis obligating them to pay producers for a high percentage of the
contract volumes even if they did not actually take any
gas.
Meanwhile, to reduce their high energy costs, American industries have achieved unprecedented energy
conservation gains. The prices of refined oil products
such as industrial grade fuel oil, have fallen dramatically
in real and absolute terms with the fall in crude oil prices
since 1981.
This combination of interfuel competition and industrial conservation, stagnation, transformation and
competition has kept the market clearing burnertip
prices for industrial fuels at unexpectedly low levels.
Burdened with the obligation to pay high wellhead
prices on a take-or-pay basis, natural gas pipe lines have
often been unable to retain their industrial loads. As a
result, a gas deliverability surplus, known as the gas
bubble, has overhung the natural gas wellhead and burnertip markets for the last five years. Energy experts
differ as to when, if ever, this gas bubble will dissipate.
In attempts to retain their non-captive industrial
loads, pipe lines and local distribution companies have
offered preferential prices to their price-elastic industrial customers, imposed higher rates on their residential and captive industrial customers, and curtailed
purchases of gas from producers lacking contracts and
from producers having contracts which do not contain
irrevocable take-or-pay obligations. Facing enormous
take-or-pay liabilities, some pipe lines have discontinued
purchasing lower-priced gas to purchase high-priced
gas under take-or-pay contracts.
The pipe lines' attempts to deal with the gas bubble
at the burnertip have produced a confusion-generating
bubble at the wellhead. Many minority working interest
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owners, who by custom in some states have sold their gas
without contract to the pipe lines with which their operators have contracted, have lost their purchasers. As a
consequence, gas from their wells is being sold under
contract by majority owners/operators while their gas is
being left in the ground. Should this contintue, these
minority owners may be faced with the choice of leaving
their remaining gas reserves in the grotnd forever, or
selling them at distressed prices to either the majority
owner or the connected pipe line. Other curtailed producers face drainage problems because their wells are
within the drainage range of the wells of others who still
have a market for their production.
At tile same time, many producing states are finding
demand prorationing to be an unattractive way of' contending with the gas bubble. Absent all states adopting
demand prorationing, states which do adopt it run the
risk that pipe lines will nominate demands far below
their contract volumes to acquire a regulatory excuse for
not honoring their take-or-pay obligations. For take-orpay clauses may not cover gas volumes a producer is
capable of delivering but is prohibited from producing
by reduced production allowables set during the demand prorationing process. Given the opportunity to
reduce take-or-pay obligations by regulatory manipulation, pipe lines have a positive incentive to understate
their demands for natural gas from demand prorationing states to gain financial room for fully honoring takeor-pay obligations to producers in states refusing to
engage in demand prorationing. The end result may be
that producers in a demand prorationing state will lose
much of the economic value of their take-or-pay contracts, and as a conseqence, the treasuries of such states
will lose millions of tax dollars.
The unattractiveness of demand prorationing has
revived interest in ratable taking/common purchaser
regulation. Ratable taking/connon purchaser regulation requires purchasers to distribute ratably their demands for gas at the wellhead among all producers who
are willing to accept reasonable prices and who can
reasonably be connected to the purchasers' gas transportation system. Through this type of regulation, the state
can more evenly spread the detrimental effects of' a
declining market demand so that no single producer or
class of producer has to bear the total burden.
The practical significance of this case is that it may
determine who must bear the brunt of risks inherent in
a stagnant or declining deregulated natural gas market
that is severely distorted by past regulatory and contracting practices. Producers with long-term take-or-pay contracts, interstate pipe lines with large take-or-pay
liabilities and the customers of such interstate pipe lines
will be the short-term winners from a holding that ratable taking/comnion purchaser regulation continues to
be unconstitutional as applied to interstate pipe lines.
Among the losers of a ruling that Northern Natural
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has continuing vitality would be producers not fortunate
or powerful enough to lure pipe lines into long term
take-or-pay contracts. Such producers would Face enhanced risks of total production shutdowns during times
of market downturns.
To the extent that producing states must continue to
combat waste-causing production patterns with demand
prorationing instead of ratable taking/common purchaser regulation, they will be faced with permanent
losses of significant tax revenues with their only choice
being whether to take most of the losses up front by
reducing well allowables to prevent waste-or to defer
some of the losses to later years by tolerating the waste
that will occur in absence of well allowable reductions. If
this Hobson's choice results in a significant waste of
natural gas, the future supply security of all American
natural gas users will be threatened.
The legal significance of this case is narrow. In fact,
the only legal issue that may be settled here is whether
the NGPA's deregulation mechanisms eliminated as to
certain categories of natural gas the federal regulation
which the Court in Northern Natural found to be
preemptive of state ratable taking/common purchaser
regulation.
It is unfortunate that the arguments in this case, and
therefore its probable legal significance, are so limited.
The waste issue has been the primary emphasis of other
producing states that have chosen to reapply ratable
taking/common purchaser statutes to the purchasing
practices of interstate pipe lines. These waste prevention
ratable taking orders have not been confined to purchases of deregulated natural gas. For these reasons,
other state challenges to the vitality of Northern Natural
provide settings more optimal than Transco for reassessing the conflicting state/federal interests involved in
state exercises of ratable taking/common purchaser
regulation.
ARGUMENTS
ForTranscontinentalGas Pipe Line Corp. (Counsel of Record,
John MarshallGrower, 1400 First NationalBank Building, P. 0.
Drawer119,Jackson, MS 39205; telephone (601) 948-3101)
1. Mississippi's ratable taking regulations are preempted
by federal regulation of natural gas.
2. Mississippi's ratable taking regulations impermissibly
burden and discriminate against interstate commerce.

Issue No. 5

For Coastal Exploration, Inc. (Counsel of Record, Glenn
Gates Taylor, Suite 112 CapitalTowers, P. 0. Drawer2132,
Jackson, MS 39225; telephone (601) 354-0123)
1. Mississippi's ratable taking regulation is not
preempted by federal law.
2. Mississippi's ratable taking regulation does not violate
the Commerce Clause.
Forthe State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi(Counsel of
Record, Ed Davis Noble, Jr., P. 0. Box 220, Jackson, MS
39205; telephone (601) 359-3680)
1. When the price of certain natural resources was deregulated as provided by the NGPA, Congress ceded
to the states the authority to impose its ratable taking/common purchaser regulations on interstate pipe
lines.
2. Mississippi's ratable taking regulations do not offend
the Commerce Clause because their operations are
reasonably calculated to protect the legitimate state
interest of insuring the opportunity of receiving a fair
share of the benefits.

AMICI ARGUMENTS
In Support of Transco
The United States and the FERC, the Associated Gas
Distributors and the Interstate Natural Gas Association
of America filed separate briefs emphasizing that state
ratable taking regulation conflicts impermissibly with
the FERC's federal regulatory authority over the purchasing, transportation and resale practices of interstate
pipe lines-and with the primary goal of the NGPA to
create a unified national natural gas market.
In Support of the State Oil and Gas Boardof Mississippi
The state of Texas in one brief, and the National
Governors' Association, the National League of Cities,
the National Association of Counties, the International
City Management Association and the United States
Conference of Mayors in another, contend that the passage of the NGPA repealed the preemptive power of the
NGA and Northern Natural over state ratable taking laws
as applied to deregulated high-cost gas and that state
laws should not be invalidated under the Commerce
Clause unless they discriminate against interstate commerce.
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